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Abstract 
We evaluate some alternative and strategic policies for the Plurinational State of Bolivia following the 
ending of preferences under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), 
especially the possibility of the country joining the talks on the partial agreement negotiated between 
the Andean Community countries and the European Union under a variety of formats (full 
liberalization or partial liberalization that excludes sensitive products). The study concludes that for 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, being part of an Andean Community-European Union (AC-EU) 
agreement is a better alternative than maintaining the status quo whereby the country benefits from the 
enhanced generalized preferences granted to it by the EU (GSP+). However, there is a need for 
complementary measures to ensure that the benefits of trade are inclusive, as the gains are largely 
confined to higher-income segments of the population and so do not necessarily do anything to reduce 
the current unequal pattern of income distribution.  
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I. Introduction 
Discussions about the benefits of international free trade are not conclusive. Free trade supporters 
argue that exchanging goods and services is almost always to their mutual benefit (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 2003). Open markets permit national resources to be employed more productively and allow 
sourcing non-local produced goods, giving consumers and producers a wider variety of products to 
choose from. Nonetheless, others perceive that free trade has not contributed to economic 
development, and in some cases has worsened inequality, unemployment and poverty particularly in 
the rural areas of developing countries (Berthelot, 2002). Jimenez et al. (2005) assert that economic 
gains from international trade do not guarantee in themselves gains for the poorer sectors of the 
economy, and that indeed more international exchange of goods might be accompanied by a rise in 
inequality. The 2001 Zanzibar Declaration reflects the concern of Least Developed Countries at their 
marginalization in the multilateral trading system as manifested in the insignificant 0.4 percent share 
of world trade (WTO, 2001). 
Yet, countries around the world, developed and developing, have engaged in a trend of 
negotiating multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements. The WTO reports that at December 
2008, there were up to 421 regional trade agreements that were notified. The Plurinational State of 
Bolivia has not avoided this trend, signing several trade agreements since the 1960s, though has not 
faced a hectic agenda in the last ten years. In fact, existing trade agreements for the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia are relatively old, such as the Andean Community (1969); Economic Complementation 
Agreement (ACE 22) with Chile (1994); Economic Complementation Agreement (ACE 31) with 
Mexico (1994); inclusion into the WTO (1995); MERCOSUR as associated member (1996); and the 
Economic Complementation Agreement (ACE 47) with Cuba (1999). The latest agreement was the 
Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean -ALBA in Spanish- (2006) that has been 
spearheaded by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
In 2004 the Andean Community (CAN) tried, as a bloc, to negotiate a trade agreement with 
the United States. However, negotiations failed due to disagreements within the bloc and political 
frictions between the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Ecuador with the United States. Peru and 
Colombia individually signed trade agreements with the US in 2005 and 2006, respectively. The 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Ecuador failed to reach any agreement, without any sign to restart 
negotiations for the time being. Furthermore, trade preferences that the United States grants to Andean 
countries called ‘Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act’ (ATPDEA) was not renewed 
for the Plurinational State of Bolivia (expired in December 2008), though it was renewed for Ecuador 
until December 2010. For Colombia and Peru, these trade preferences were superseded by the more 
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comprehensive FTA, which provides permanent duty-free status to a wider range of commodities 
from those two countries into the United States. 
In September 2007, the Andean Community started joint negotiations with the European 
Union. However, the Plurinational State of Bolivia’s differing views on property rights and tariff 
reduction schedules led to disagreements with other Andean countries. In spite of the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia’s request to CAN members to negotiate with the EU as a group, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Peru expressed their preference for individual negotiations. Thus, in February 2009 these three 
countries started bilateral negotiations with the EU, while the Plurinational State of Bolivia has frozen 
any trade negotiation for the time being.  
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the economic effects for the Bolivian 
economy that may emerge from the Plurinational State of Bolivia-EU related trade scenarios. This 
study assesses how convenient is for the Plurinational State of Bolivia to be taking part or be outside 
negotiations with the EU, and the subsequent preferential access implications for the Bolivian 
economy. At the current time, there is no economic assessment on how the economic wellbeing of the 
domestic population and macroeconomic indicators may change as a result of a Plurinational State of 
Bolivia-EU trade agreement. Thus study will try to fill that void and provide with an assessment that 
can be used by policy makers in the Plurinational State of Bolivia to formulate trade and 
complementary policies. 
This document is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the current trade situation of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, the objectives and research questions. Section 3 reviews the work that 
has been done in terms of EU-Plurinational State of Bolivia trade agreements. Section 4 provides an 
overview of the Bolivian external sector (exports and imports) as well as a short discussion of main 
exporting goods and trading partners. Section 5 presents the methodology chosen to asses a 
prospective trade association agreement from a macro and micro viewpoints. This section also defines 
trade policy scenarios, criteria for grouping GTAP regions and commodity sectors, price transmission 
model and the micro-simulation approach used in this research. Section 6 discusses macro-simulation 
results. Section 7 presents micro-simulation results and corresponding discussion. Finally, Section 8 
presents conclusions and recommendations emerging from this study. 
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II. Problem, objectives and research questions 
After the end of trade preferences (ATPDEA) from the Unites States, the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia lost preferential access to the American market for some important products. The loss of these 
preferences to such large and important market would need to be filled by either new markets in other 
regions such as Asia or the strengthening of existing ones. One of those markets where the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia already has commercial ties is the European Union. 
The European Union could be an alternative market to replace the ATPDEA, given that the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia already exports to the EU (with no trade agreement involved) and 
because it is an attractive market niche for any country that looks for higher prices and a large 
consumer market (the EU is the second largest importer in the world; the first one is the US). Taking 
into account the potential of the EU as importer is that the Andean Community, as a group, started 
negotiations with the European Union in 2007. However, Andean countries have different trade 
policies and strategies on the implications that might emerge from that trade agreement. Given that 
group negotiations between the Andean Community and the EU stalled, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador 
reoriented their negotiation agendas toward bilateral trade agreements. Therefore it is reasonable to 
consider that a trade-off between having or not an agreement with the EU needs to be assessed. 
Based on these developments, the Bolivian government will need to reconsider its trade 
policy if these policies are going to be used as economic tool to contribute improving the domestic 
welfare of the Bolivian people. Interests and expectations from the Bolivian production sector, policy 
makers, and civil society might emerge if the Plurinational State of Bolivia decides to initiate trade 
negotiations with the European Union. But also some concerns might emerge regarding EU’s stronger 
export-related capacity compared to the Plurinational State of Bolivia.  
There is no specific research has been carried out to estimate the economic implications that 
such a trade agreement would have for both the national economy and the economic wellbeing of 
Bolivian households. Such lack of research is an issue in terms of policy possibilities to provide 
estimations as to how the various economic sectors in the Plurinational State of Bolivia would be 
affected by the trade agreement. This lack of research prevents the development of effective trade 
policies oriented to benefit both the national economy and the majority of Bolivian households. We 
expect to fill that gap with this study. 
The overall objective of this research is to estimate the effects for the Bolivian economy and 
its households that could emerge from different trade reform settings between the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia and the European Union. More specific objectives are: 
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• First, to investigate economic implications emerging from termination of the ATPDEA. 
• Second, to assess the impact of trade policy measures with the EU (changes in tariffs) on 
the progress of key macroeconomic variables (e.g. exports, imports, production and 
GDP). 
• Third, to estimate the economic effects of the trade reforms affecting households’ 
wellbeing (in the form of changes in income and expenditures), in particular the impact 
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III. Literature survey 
For the Plurinational State of Bolivia, a prospective trade agreement with the EU has not received 
attention in terms of research efforts. Thus, this study would be the first attempt on that direction. 
However, there are few empirical studies with marginal references to trade policy options for the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, which we think are useful for this survey. These studies can be grouped 
into three broad categories: macroeconomic effects resulting from domestic policies and structural 
reforms; sectoral effects emerging from exchange rate shocks; and trade effects resulting from the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia-US trade simulation agreements. 
In the first category of macroeconomic studies, Thiele and Wiebelt (2003a) used a 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to evaluate the Bolivian poverty reduction strategy 
over the period 1985-1999. These authors assert that the Bolivian poverty reduction strategy has not 
been pro-poor, as it largely bypassed sensitive economic sectors, such as agriculture. Two main 
drawbacks were identified in this study: a) no assessment of changes in rural income which challenges 
conclusions about changes in rural poverty; and b) lack of attention to external shocks which 
overlooks the influence of trade agreements on Bolivian GDP growth. On the other hand, Jimenez et 
al. (2005) look into the role of Bolivian institutions in GDP growth. Using an econometric model for 
the period 1970-2003, they found that domestic income growth in the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
has been negatively affected by large fiscal deficits, high inflation rates and high vulnerability to 
external shocks. In contrast, it is positively related to government investment and stability of 
government institutions. Relevant to this study, the authors found that economic growth did not 
guarantee gains for the poorer sectors of the economy, as inequality rose during that period. Klasen 
(2005) discussed the pro-poor growth policies in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and linkages 
between income and non-income dimensions of poverty. Klasen’s research has helped broaden the 
view of poverty analysis in the Plurinational State of Bolivia by quantifying the poor’s income 
wellbeing (money metric estimation of income) and non-income wellbeing (i.e. education, health and 
gender equality). However, Klasen does not analyze how trade policies have affected both rural and 
urban households in the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
Within the group of studies that analyze sectoral effects, Jemio and Wiebelt (2003) used a 
CGE model for the Plurinational State of Bolivia to test anti-shock domestic policies to palliate the 
negative effects emerging from external shocks (e.g. deterioration of terms of trade and direct foreign 
investment). They found that the Bolivian economy was highly vulnerable to external shocks, and that 
anti-shock policies had domestic restrictions (i.e. ‘dollarization’ of the Bolivian economy and high 
fiscal deficit) that prevented them from operating effectively against these external shocks. This result 
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is important as it raises questions about the efficacy of applying expansive fiscal policies to reduce the 
impact of deteriorating terms of trade. Barja et al. (2004) analyzed household welfare in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia in the period 1999-2002 using a static model to simulate the impacts of 
social expenditure and external shocks (terms of trade) over household income groups. The authors 
found that maintaining domestic stability free from external shocks is one of the most effective 
mechanisms for avoiding welfare losses and maximizing poverty reduction in the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia. This study was comprehensive, as it considered both the financial limitations of the 
Bolivian government to implement aggressive social welfare programs, and the way households’ 
expenditure was affected by government social payments. 
Thiele and Wiebelt (2003b) used a CGE model for the Plurinational State of Bolivia to 
analyze the effects of reduced foreign investment inflows and the ‘El Niño’ phenomenon. They show 
that these external shocks have hindered the attainment of the Plurinational State of Bolivia’s goals on 
poverty reduction and income growth over the period 1985–1999. The authors explored devaluation 
measures the Bolivian government applied to diminish the impact of such external shock on the 
livelihoods of rural and urban households. They found that devaluation measures did not reduce the 
poverty effect of external shocks, because household consumer prices rose much more than wage 
indexation (exercised under devaluation), thereby eroding the purchasing power of households.  
Finally, within the studies that analyze the effects of the Plurinational State of Bolivia-US 
trade relations, Durán et al. (2007) used a GTAP CGE model to simulate the effect that a collective 
FTA between Colombia, Ecuador and Peru with the United States could have over these countries. 
Their results suggest that Peru and the United States would accrue for the majority of welfare gains, 
while Colombia and Ecuador would experience more modest gains. For the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, Durán et al. found that this trade agreement would generate trade diversion and welfare 
losses. Valenzuela and Andriamananjara (2008) explored the effects of a FTA between the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and the United States using the GTAP model and data base, Version 7.0. 
These authors also explored the effects of the end of US-trade preferences on the Bolivian economy. 
On the other hand, Telleria et al. (2007) and Giordano et al. (2007) explored several trade agreement 
scenarios between the Plurinational State of Bolivia and the United States, focusing on the analysis on 
how trade liberalisation would affect the livelihoods of Bolivian households by income level and 
geographical location. Both studies find that a termination of ATPDEA preference would harm the 
Bolivian economy. 
However, these studies do not provide an analysis of trade strategies that the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia could implement following the termination of the ATPDEA. Also, and as discussed 
before there is no study that, focusing on the Plurinational State of Bolivia, analyses the trade 
negotiations between Andean countries and the EU and the different policy alternatives that the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia has. In this context, this research evaluates trade policy alternatives and 
strategies to fill that gap. 
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IV. Bolivian economy and trade policy 
The world economy in the 1980’s was characterized by changes that led to the formation of economic blocs 
and extend the effects of the globalization to the world economy. Large groups such as the European Union 
were assembled and reinforced. The European Union inspired a process of world integration, as it 
represented one of the most important efforts governments carried out to integrate themselves in social, 
economic and cultural dimensions. At the end of the eighties, the Andean Community was revamped 
becoming an Andean free trade area. Within the framework of the Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI), southern countries formed the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). 
In the nineties, the Plurinational State of Bolivia focused on deepening integration within the 
Andean Community, subscribing different trade agreements, and negotiating unilateral preferential 
treatment like the ATPDEA to the US and the Generalized System of Preferences (SGP Plus) to Europe. 
Additionally, the Plurinational State of Bolivia implemented an open and free market strategy, 
deregulating the domestic economy and privatising state enterprises (among others) to meet IMF 
conditions to generate more employment, investment, economic growth, and ultimately more economic 
welfare. Part of the policy measures implemented in the 1990’s consisted in lowering import tariffs. 
Such lowering is referred here as “näive de-tariffication” since the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
unilaterally lowered import tariffs losing negotiating capabilities in bilateral, regional and multilateral 
trade negotiations. Import tariff reductions started in 1987 and ended-up in 1995 establishing a general 
and easy tariff structure setting 10% for general products, 5% for capital goods and 2% for books.  
Later between 2000 and 2004, the Plurinational State of Bolivia suffered domestic political 
and economic crises. While Colombia, Ecuador and Peru began trade negotiations with the United 
States in May 2004, the Plurinational State of Bolivia did not participated of these negotiations due to 
such political crises that eventually contributed to the election of Evo Morales as Bolivian president in 
2005. His government prioritised policies that supported the domestic market, rejecting any possibility 
of trade negotiations with the United States. Instead, in 2006 the Plurinational State of Bolivia joined 
the so-called Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America (Alternativa Bolivariana para los 
Pueblos de Nuestra América, ALBA). In September 2008 the Morales administration expelled the US 
ambassador in La Paz. In December of the same year, the United States did not extend the ATPDEA 
to the Plurinational State of Bolivia, arguing that the Plurinational State of Bolivia failed to cooperate 
with anti-narcotic efforts.  
In this context of unstable political situation in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, domestic 
exports grew substantially, especially from 2004 onwards, far exceeding the level of imports (Figure 
1). However, this tendency of the last four years has not prevailed in the last thirty years. Throughout 
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the 1980’s exports and imports ranged between US$500 – 1000 million, with exports usually 
exceeding the level of imports by small margins. During the 1990’s up to 2003, the trade balance 
experienced permanent deficits, reaching its peak in 1998 where the trade deficit was more than 
US$1.3 billion, the highest deficit in the Bolivian trade balance in the last 30 years.  
In the last few years, the exporting sector started to experience a favourable context due to the 
economic growth of neighbouring countries, Brazil and Argentina mainly. The economic growth of 
these two economies meant higher demand and better prices for Bolivian exports, especially natural 
gas. Due to these developments, for the first time in more than a decade Bolivian exports outpaced 
imports in 2004, and since then the trade balance has become largely positive, reaching a peak of 
US$1.85 billion in 2008. 
 
FIGURE 1 
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A comparison between total exports from January to June in 2008 and 2009 shows that right 
after ATPDEA termination (December 2008) exports decreased for almost a billion of US dollars 
(Figure 1). Also in the first semester 2009 imports decreased by smaller amounts (about 200 hundred 
million dollars). This might have been due to the fact that in January 2009 the Bolivian government 
moderately increased tariffs for some commodity groups (Annex 1 shows tariff increments before and 
after ATPDEA). Yet, the trade balance was positive in the first semester 2009 (350 million US$), 
though not as large as the one achieved in 2008 (more than one billion US$). 
Figure 2 shows that the structure of Bolivian exports has changed overtime. In 1980 exports 
of manufactures and minerals lead the Bolivian exports (38 and 36 percent respectively). In 1994 
manufactures, which are products with value-added activities, dominated Bolivian exports with more 
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than 60% of the total exports. The importance of the manufacturing industry somehow prevailed for 
the next 10 years, when exports of hydrocarbons started to grow substantially.  
By 2008 Hydrocarbon and Minerals, which are products with a limited degree of 
transformation, dominated with 74% of total exports, while manufactures share decreased from about 
40% in 1980 to 24% in 2008 (though in absolute values increased from 400 to 1641 million dollars 
respectively). The share of agricultural goods decreased from 10% in 1994 to 4% in 2008 though, 
likewise manufactures, increased in absolute terms (from 34 million in 1980 to 271 millions in 2008). 
The most impressive growth corresponds, without any doubt, to exports of hydrocarbons (mainly 
natural gas). Between 1980 and 2000 it fluctuated from 100 to 230 million dollars per year; however it 
grew from 1400 million in 2005 to 3470 millions in 2008 (about 50% of total Bolivian exports). In 
fact, from 2005 onwards about half of domestic exports corresponded to exports of hydrocarbons. 
 
FIGURE 2 
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística – INE. Elaboration: Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior – IBCE. 
 
 
This growth has a privatisation history behind. In 1993 Mr Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, 
Bolivian president who favoured policy measures prescribed by the IMF, decided to initiate an 
aggressive privatization programme. This programme (which was inspired in the well-known 
structural adjustment programmes) included privatisation of all hydrocarbon-related industry which 
until then was in public sector hands. Brazilian and Argentinean oil companies bought the majority of 
the shares of the industry, and invested large amounts in oil exploration. Thanks to these investments 
in the early 2000, it was found out that the Plurinational State of Bolivia has the second largest 
reserves of natural gas in Latin America (the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is in the first place). In 
2006, it did not come as a surprise that, given the large economic benefits exports of natural gas was 
yielding to the privatised oil company, the Morales administration decided to nationalize the 
hydrocarbon industry. 
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The nationalization of the oil industry did not change much the composition of exports by 
partner, as they have traditionally being few and located in the Americas (Figure 3). Throughout 2004 
to 2008 the Plurinational State of Bolivia exported growing values of merchandises to all economic 
blocs. From 2004 to 2008 MECOSUR’s share increased from 39% to 52% of total Bolivian exports. 
This growth is explained by increased exports of natural gas to Brazil and Argentina. In fact Brazil 
became the most important trading partner for the Plurinational State of Bolivia accounting for about 
40% of total exports in 2008 (in 2001 its share was 21%). Exports to the EU increased from 161 to 
418 million dollars between 2004 and 2008, but keeping its 7% share throughout this period. Exports 
to Asia grew also grew substantially from about US$ 200 in 2004 to almost US$ 1200 in 2008 (500% 
growth in four years). This growth is mostly explained by mineral products (zinc, silver and lead) 
exported to South Korea. Finally exports to NAFTA decreased from 16% in 2004 to half of it in 2008. 
 
FIGURE 3 


































































































































Source: Authors’ elaboration based on INE data. 
 
 
Figure 4 further disaggregates the trade relation with the European Union between 1989 and 2009 
(May). The Plurinational State of Bolivia has experienced a positive trade balance in 1989 and throughout 
the 1990s (except in 1998). The trade balance from 2001 onwards has been negative, except in 2007 where 
exports exceeded imports by US$ 57 million. While the EU is a relatively important trade partner for the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia (in 2008 Bolivian imports from the EU were US$ 417 million or 7% in total 
imports),1 The Plurinational State of Bolivia has been a very minor trade partner for the EU (total EU 
imports in 2007 was US$ 1466 trillion, where the Plurinational State of Bolivia had an insignificant share 
of 0,003 per cent). Most of the products that the Plurinational State of Bolivia exports to the European 
Union are labour-intensive goods, including zinc and concentrates, tin and borate, silver, alcohol, vegetable 
oils, quinoa, processed coffee, nuts, wood furniture and leather products. 
  
                                                        
1
  Total value of Bolivian imports from the EU grew by 67% from 1989 to 2008. 
2005 2006 2007 20092004
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FIGURE 4 
PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA – EUROPEAN UNION TRADE BALANCE 






































Source: Instituto de Estadística (INE). Elaboration: Instituto de Comercio Exterior (IBCE). 
 
 
Figure 5 disaggregates export to the most important trading bloc for the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia. From 1996 to 2003 the trade balance between MERCOSUR and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia had been negative. It only became largely positive from 2004 onwards when the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia started to sell natural gas to Brazil and Argentina. As seen in this figure, exports to 
Paraguay (US$ 54 million) and Uruguay (US$ 3 million) were irrelevant in 2008 in comparison with 
exports to Brazil (US$ 3.023 million) and to Argentina (US$ 493 million). This situation changes 
dramatically when exports of natural gas are withdrawn from total exports. 
 
FIGURE 5 
TRADE BALANCE BETWEEN THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA  
AND MERCOSUR 
(In millions of US dollars and percentages) 
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FIGURE 6 
PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA - MERCOSUR TRADE BALANCE,  
WITHOUT NATURAL GAS  
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Source: Instituto de Estadística (INE). Elaboration: Instituto de Comercio Exterior (IBCE). 
 
 
Figure 6 shows a comparison between exports to MERCOSUR with and without natural gas. 
With no exports of natural gas, the Plurinational State of Bolivia would have had a permanent trade 
deficit with MERCOSUR, which from 1996 to 2008 would have accrued to US$ 8.433 million (IBCE 
- Menacho, 2009). Bolivian exports to Brazil (accounting natural gas) were US$ 3.023 million in 
2008, but with no gas exports they would just be US$ 52 million. Likewise exports to Argentina with 
natural gas were in 2008 were US$ 493 million, but without gas they would just be US$ 42 million. 
These figures show how important natural gas has become to the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
which have been financing the level of imports. This overview of the Bolivian external sector shows that 
relying in a few trading partners might leave the country vulnerable to foreign shocks such as price and 
demand contractions, which may cause volatile foreign currency inflows. The fact that about 50% of 
exports comes from hydrocarbons leaves the Plurinational State of Bolivia in a situation of highly 
dependency not only to gas prices, but also on fiscal revenues as natural gas is the main source of fiscal 
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V. Methodology - A macro-micro simulation 
approach 
This section presents the research approach that has been followed to estimate the changes in the 
Bolivian economy and household groups resulting from liberalization scenarios between the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and the EU. This approach consists of a combination of a macro simulation 
model (in the form of a Computable General Equilibrium - CGE) and a micro-simulation approach (in 
form of Laspeyres price indices for income and expenditure), which in short can be referred to as a 
‘macro-micro approach’. 
A. Introduction to macro-micro simulations 
The impacts of trade reforms over rural and urban households in the developing world have become a 
major concern of the WTO negotiations (Hertel et al., 2005). This concern is also reflected in the 
‘Millennium Development Goals’ which commits governments to halve poverty by 2015. According 
to Vandemoortele (2009), the establishment of a fair and improved international trading system is an 
important component in achieving this goal. To analyse such impacts, researchers have used a variety 
of tools, including the combined use of a CGE model with micro-simulation models, also called 
macro-micro simulation approach. 
The macro-micro approach consists of using a CGE model to simulate policy shocks. The 
results, including changes in commodity prices, returns to factors of production, GDP, imports and 
exports and terms of trade are used by a micro-simulation approach that allows analysis of the effects 
of such policies at household-group level. For social and economic policy analysis this technique has 
the advantage of producing results that can be evaluated at the household level. 
In general terms, the macro-micro simulation approach aims to answer the key question of 
how trade reforms affect the wellbeing of different household groups (Telleria et al., 2007). Given that 
the household data available for this research contains earnings and consumption data, we measure 
economic wellbeing by bi-featured indicators: income and expenditure. Both provide a measure of the 
economic wellbeing of an individual. However, we acknowledge that economic wellbeing viewed in 
this way is a narrower picture of a more comprehensive wellbeing concept, which would include other 
components such as health, education, housing, etc. Section 4.4 describes in more detail the micro-
simulation approach. 
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The GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) has been chosen as the macro-simulation model, while the 
micro-simulation approach uses price indexes as defined by Ianchovichina et al. (2002). The GTAP 
model is a standard, static, multi-region, multi-sector general equilibrium model which includes 
explicitly treatment of international trade and transport margins, global savings and investment, and 
price and income responsiveness across countries. It assumes perfect competition, constant returns to 
scale, and an Armington specification for bilateral trade flows that differentiates trade by origin. It 
also assumes a fixed factor endowment and full factor use. In this research we use the GTAP Data 
Base, version 7.0, which represents a snapshot of the world economy in the year 2004. The results of 
this model for all variables are expressed as relative changes from the original GTAP Data Base. That 
is, results are percentage changes from the base case scenario. The macro-micro approach has been 
applied in three stages: 
(i) First, we set a pre-simulation (or pre-liberalisation) scenario where, based on the 
household database, values of the consumption basket and income levels are estimated 
for each household category. 
(ii) The second stage is the simulation of trade liberalisation scenarios using the GTAP 
model. The results of such simulations are then analyzed against key macroeconomic 
indicators of the Bolivian economy. 
(iii) Finally, we use the results from the general equilibrium model (percentage changes in 
prices of commodities and sources of income), to estimate money metric estimations of 
changes in households’ spending and revenues using the micro-simulation approach. We 
use a cointegration model to analyse the degree of integration between primary and 
secondary markets, so estimating price transmission coefficients. Then, we compared 
both the pre- and post-liberalisation scenarios and analyzed the impacts of trade reforms 
on households’ economic wellbeing. 
Given the large size of the GTAP database, the amount of computational resources needed to 
compute the data is usually very large and, therefore, for the simulations to be solvable data 
aggregation is needed (Hertel et al, 2004). The 113 regions (or countries) and 57 sectors (commodity 
groups) available in the GTAP database version 7.0 were aggregated into 14 regions and 35 sectors 
(Annex 2). 
The regional aggregation criterion used consisted of choosing countries that are important 
trade partners for the Plurinational State of Bolivia. South American countries, the United States and 
the European Union represent between 77 and 97% of total Bolivian exports to the world between 
1994 and 2006. The 57 GTAP sectors were aggregated into 35 sectors that are important commodities 
for trade flows (importing and exporting sectors), employment generation and food security. For 
purposes of presentation of results, these 35 sectors were further aggregated into five commodity 
sectors namely ‘Agriculture’, ‘Mining and natural resources’, ‘Light manufactures’, ‘Heavy 
manufactures, and ‘Services’ (Annex 3). 
 
TABLE 1 
GROUPS OF COUNTRIES AND REGIONS USED IN MACRO SIMULATIONS 
No. Region Description 
1 Bolivia (Plur. State of) Bolivia (Plur. State of) 
2 United States United States 
3 EU27 
European Union 27: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Cszech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia 
4 Mexico Mexico 
(continued) 
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Table 1 (concluded) 
No. Region Description 
5 Argentina Argentina 
6 Brazil Brazil 
7 Chile Chile 
8 Colombia Colombia 
9 Ecuador Ecuador 
10 Paraguay Paraguay 
11 Peru Peru 
12 Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 
13 Rest of Latin America Uruguay, Guyana, Suriname, Central America and the Caribbean 
14 Rest of the world Asia, Africa, Oceania 
 




SECTORAL AND REGIONAL AGGREGATION OF THE GTAP DATABASE, VERSION 7.0 
No. Sector  Description 
1 
Agriculture 
Rice Paddy rice 
2 Wheat Wheat 
3 Cereals Cereals 
4 VegFruitNuts Fruits and Vegetables 
5 OilSeeds Oil seeds 
6 SugarCane Sugar cane 
7 PlantBasFib Plant based fibers 




10 Fores&Fish Forestry and Fishing 
11 
Mining and natural 
resources 
Oil&Coal Oil and coal 
12 Gas Gas 
13 MinExtrac Mineral Extraction 
14 BovMeatPro Meats 
15 VegOilsFats Vegetable oils and fats 
16 DairyProdu Dairy products 




19 OtherFood Other food 
20 BevTobac Beverages and Tobacco 
21 Textiles Textiles 
22 Apparel Wearing Apparel 
23 LeatherProdu Leather products 
24 WoodProdu Wood products 
25 PaperProdu Paper products 
26 PetroleuCoal Petroleum and coal products 
27 ChemRubPlast Chemical products 
28 MinerProdu Mineral products 
29 Heavy 
manufactures 
Ferr&NonFe Ferrous and Non-ferrous metals 
30 MetalProduct Metal Products 
(continued) 
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Table 2 (concluded) 
No. Sector  Description 
31 
 
MotorVehicle Motor Vehicles and Transport 
32 ElectEquipm Electronic equipment 
33 MachinEquipm Machinery and Equipment 
34 Manufact Other Manufactures nec 
35 Services Services 
Utilities, construction, trade, transport, 
communications, financial and business services, 
public admin. 
Source: Authors’ classification based on results from GTAP 7.0 simulations. 
 
B. Trade scenarios and sensitive commodities 
The latest development in the Plurinational State of Bolivia-US trade relationship resulted in the end 
of the ATPDEA for the Plurinational State of Bolivia in December 2008. In light of this new status 
quo, we formulate a series of trade scenarios that tries to reflect this new development, as well as to 
analyze the ex-ante economic effects of the the Plurinational State of Bolivia-EU trade agreement. 
Thus, the definition of the trade scenarios was based on identification of sensitive commodities, 
updating of trade developments, and enquires to the Bolivian government as to what were the most 
likely trade settings in a prospective trade agreement. 
We also account for sensitive commodities from both the EU and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia for the simulation scenarios. From the EU trade negotiations with Peru, Colombia and 
Ecuador, it is evident that the EU has provided a particular protection to some commodity groups 
considered as sensitive. These commodities include fruits and vegetables, meat, dairy products, sugar, 
beverages and tobacco, and other food products. In the case of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
products to which the Plurinational State of Bolivia provides a special protection when negotiating 
trade agreements include rice, wheat, oilseeds, meats, dairy products, sugar, textiles and leather 
products. We also consider sensitive products for Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. These include rice, 
wheat, cereals, fruits and vegetables, plant based fibers, meat, milk, paper products, textiles, motor 
vehicles and chemical products. Based on this, the trade scenarios tested were: 
• Scenario 1: No ATPDEA (termination of the ATPDEA). This scenario simulates the 
economic impacts of the end of the ATPDEA. In this scenario US tariffs for Bolivian 
products increase on all goods that previously benefited from ATPDEA trade preference 
(Annex 4 shows tariff changes before and after ATPDEA). The Plurinational State of 
Bolivia also increases tariffs to some products imported from the US. 
The results of this first scenario serve as the new baseline for the next four scenarios. That is, 
the GTAP database is updated to incorporate the end of the ATPDEA for the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia. This new baseline is used to analyze ex-ante the impacts of a trade agreement 
between the European Union and Andean countries. The four scenarios considered are: 
• Scenario 2: CAN – EU Total Liberalisation. In this scenario all products from Andean 
countries (the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) enter duty-
free into the European Union, and vice-versa. 
• Scenario 3: CAN – EU with ‘sensitive products’. Sensitive products from both Andean 
countries and the EU are excluded from the trade liberalisation treaty. Tariffs for all other 
products are eliminated. 
• Scenario 4: CAN – EU Total Liberalisation without the Plurinational State of Bolivia. All 
Andean countries except the Plurinational State of Bolivia sign a trade agreement with the 
EU. All tradable products enter duty-free into both regional blocs. 
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• Scenario 5: CAN – EU Total Liberalisation without the Plurinational State of Bolivia and 
with ‘sensitive products’. In this scenario all Andean countries except the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia sign a trade agreement with the EU. All tradable products, except those 
considered sensitive ones’, enter duty-free into both regional blocs. 
The first two scenarios assume that the Plurinational State of Bolivia signs a trade agreement 
with the European Union along with the other Andean countries. The last two scenarios assume that 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia does not sign a trade agreement with the EU, but the other Andean 
countries do. Within each pair of scenarios, we consider total liberalization and partial liberalization, 
this last which accounts for sensible products. 
1. Modifications to the GTAP Data base 
As the base year of the GTAP data base version 7.0 is 2004, the database does not reflect the current 
tariff structure. That is, it does not incorporate tariff information from trade agreements stipulated after 
2004. For example, in December 2008 US tariffs to Bolivian products increased because of the end of 
trade preferences from the ATPDEA. Thus, we update the tariff information in the GTAP database to 
incorporate trade reforms up to a new base year, in this case 2008. Using this new baseline we 
simulate first the end of the ATPDEA, and upon this new baseline, we simulate the trade liberalization 
scenarios between the EU and the Andean countries (Annex 4 shows tariff modification before and 
after modifications in tariff information). 
C. Market integration 
As explained before, commodity prices change as result of trade reforms. However, those changes in 
international commodity prices might not affect domestic prices uniformly. Nicita (2005) and Hertel 
and Winters (2005) suggest that households living in urban areas are more sensible to changes in 
prices at the border than rural areas. For rural regions only a fraction of international prices are felt, 
especially in the case of agricultural products. Nicita (2005) finds that for Mexico international prices 
are transmitted differentially within regions, depending on the type of product and distance to the 
border. The price transmission or “pass-through” of international prices to domestic prices at the 
border was 66 percent for manufactured products, but only 25 percent for agricultural products. At the 
same time, that price transmission decreases as distance to the border increases. 
In this study we incorporate these features of imperfect price transmission between urban and 
rural areas and different type of products. This would allow distributing price changes from trade 
liberalization to households, according to their regional location in the Plurinational State of Bolivia. For 
this, we analyze whether or not there is some degree of integration between domestic primary and 
secondary markets in the short and long term. We econometrically estimate price transmission relations 
and then map those relationships directly into the economic wellbeing function of households. This 
approach allows transmitting price changes from the GTAP global CGE model into Bolivian households 
living in different geographical areas. The next section outlines this methodology more in detail. 
1. Market integration approach 
From the perspective of market integration, two or more markets are integrated when changes in 
prices in one market, are transmitted to one or more markets in equal or different degrees and at 
different speeds. To measure integration between two or more markets, we need to determine a 
causality relationship between prices in main markets (from large and well-connected cities) and 
prices in secondary markets (from smaller and weakly-connected cities). If there is causality, the sign 
and direction determines the degree of cointegration in prices in the long term. This allows estimating 
price elasticity of transmission between both markets, and the speed of adjustment in the short term. 
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To test whether markets in the Plurinational State of Bolivia are integrated or not, we use a 
cointegration test called the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). The VECM is a time series 
regression model that is based on the behavioural assumption that two or more times series exhibit an 
equilibrium relationship that determines both short and long time behaviour. VECM models are 
common time series models for estimating and testing leading indicators of cointegration, and offer 
several advantages.2 These are simple multivariate models in which a variable is explained by its own 
past values and past values of all other variables (leading indicators) in the system. 
The VECM allows identifying one or more cointegration vectors that capture the dynamics of 
price convergence between markets in the long term. Coefficients of each equation show an equilibrium 
relationship between price variables. Speed coefficients of adjustment show how fast the equilibrium is 
achieved in the long term. In addition, the coefficients indicate those variables (i.e. prices) that adjust in 
the system after the shock has occurred. However, the speed coefficients of adjustment cannot tell the 
time needed for prices to adjust. Engler and Nahuelhual (2003) indicate that if speed coefficients are 1, 
then variables would respond immediately (i.e. one month). For lower coefficient values such as 0.75 
then the reaction is slower. In general, the smaller the coefficient the slower the variable reaction. 
The first steps to test for cointegration is to conduct Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on 
each of the price time series to determine if they are non-stationary (we hypothesize that they will not 
be stationary). Using the ADF, we tested if each time series (expressed in logarithms) hold or not a 
unitary root. Then, following Johansen (1988, 1991) we proceeded to test for cointegration. Using the 
VECM we estimated:3 (a) if some spatial integration and causality in the long term exists; and (b) the 
time needed (measured in months) for prices to adjust to equilibrium. Annex 5 presents in more detail 
the tests used to asses market cointegration. 
The data used to evaluate these dynamics of transmission between markets was price 
information for different regions and products in the Plurinational State of Bolivia. These prices were 
collected by the Fundación Valles through the Sistema Integrado de Mercados Agropecuarios 
(Integrated System of Agricultural Markets). Since 2002 to current date, the Fundación Valles has 
collected daily price information in six out of the nine departments in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia. These data includes 33 commodities from the consumption bundle of any standard Bolivian 
family. We use monthly average prices for each of those commodities, for the period from May 2002 
to August 2009. To estimate price elasticities, we transform commodity prices into logarithms. 
Annex 6 shows all departments where price information for these commodities was collected. 
These prices correspond to markets of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Sucre, Tarija and Oruro. 
Given that La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba are the most populated and better connected to 
international markets in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (where a significant share of total Bolivian 
exports come from), we consider these three cities as main domestic markets. Sucre, Tarija and Oruro, 
with low population, few companies exporting abroad and poorly connected to international markets 
are considered secondary markets. 
D. Micro-simulation approach 
The micro-simulation approach used in this analysis is the Laspeyres price indices for income and 
expenditure. The methodology consists of using the CGE model as ‘price generator’, and the micro-
simulation approach as a bridge to transmit those changes in prices to the household level. The household 
                                                        
2
 First, it allows to study the relation that prevails between time series characterised by non-stationary pattern (non-
stationarity is a very common case when analysing regressions that involve time series); Second, it is standard as 
allows stating a pre-determined structural model for the variables, which facilitates the estimation of causalities 
such as Granger; and Third, allows to explain the process that a group of variables follow to restores equilibrium 
within the system. 
3
 By pair cities, one secondary market with each primary market. 
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survey provides the structure of households’ consumption and income before the trade scenarios are 
simulated. This structure is set to a base-year using the Laspeyres cost of living and income indices. 
Price changes of commodities and price changes of sources of income (i.e. returns to factors 
of production) were obtained from the GTAP model. We adjust price transmission between the macro 
and micro models using the results from the cointegration tests. This adjustment reflects the impact of 
international price changes in domestic prices by geographical location. Using the Laspeyres indices 
for expenditure and income, the modified prices are then used to obtain a post-liberalisation structure 
of households’ consumption and income.  
The change in cost of living by segments of population provides an upper bound measurement 
of the increase/decrease in expenditure that would be required (for each population segment) to 
purchase the same quantities of goods as in the base-year (Ianchovichina et al., 2002). Also changes in 
households’ livelihoods are estimated according to changes in returns to production factors. This 
approach uses economic wellbeing and price index notions, which are described next. 
Price index 
Following Ianchovichina et al. (2002), we use the Laspeyres price index to calculate the 
impact on the expenditure side of households emerging from the different policy simulation scenarios. 
Formally, this index is defined as: 
Following Ianchovichina et al. (2002), we use the Laspeyres price index to calculate the 
impact on the expenditure side of households emerging from the different policy simulation scenarios. 














Where PL is the change in price level, pi and qi are the price and quantity of commodity i, 
respectively. Prices and quantities are indexed by time, where 0 denotes the base period, and 1 refers 
to the post simulation period. This price index is normalised to a value of 100 in the base year to 
indicate the percentage level of the price index in period 1 relative to the base year. For example, a 
price-index value of 110 in period 1 indicates that the price index is 10% higher in the first year 
compared to the base year. 
As mentioned by Ianchovichina et al. (2002), the Laspeyres index overstates the increase in 
expenditure because it does not account for substitution in consumption when prices change (zero 
elasticity of substitution). That is, households might respond to price changes by altering the quantities 
they purchase. Consequently, the Laspeyres index provides an upper bound measurement of the 
increase in expenditure. 
Changes in private utility 
Following Ianchovichina et al. (2002), we use of GTAP’s private utility equation to measure 
changes in economic wellbeing. The term ‘private utility’ is used to refer to an individual’s difference 
between the Laspeyres index for income and the Laspeyres index for expenditure: 
( ) [ ( , ) x ( , )]
( )
[ ( , ) x ( , )]
i TRAD
i TRAD
yp r CONSHR i r pp i r
up r








ECLAC – Project Documents collection Policy alternatives and strategies for the Plurinational State of Bolivia… 
26 
Where up(r) represents the percentage change in private utility in region r; yp(r) is the 
percentage change in private household income in region r; CONSHR(i,r) is the share of i in total 
consumption in region r; pp(i,r) is the percentage change in the demand price of commodity i in region r; 
INCPAR(i,r) is the income expansion parameter (elasticity) of commodity i in region r. If preferences 
are homothetic (i.e. a change in budget will allow for proportional changes in the demand of 
commodities) the INCPAR(i,r) equals 1 for all commodities, and therefore equation (2) collapses into the 
difference between a Laspeyres price index for income and a Laspeyres price index for expenditure: 
( ) ( ) [ ( , ) x ( , )]
i TRAD
up r yp r CONSHR i r pp i r
∈
= − ∑  (3) 
Equation (3) is the difference between the change in household income (returns from skilled 
labour, unskilled labour, capital, land and natural resources) 4 and the consumption share times the 
percentage change in prices summed over all commodities. In other words, this equation measures 
economic wellbeing change by computing the difference between changes in income and expenditure. 
A Laspeyres price index provides a fixed-weight approximation in the economic private utility 
emerging from a change in income sources and a change in expenditure. 
Household Data 
The data used in this study comes from the Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (BNIS, 
2002) who surveyed 5,746 households from the nine departments in which the country is 
geographically classified.5 Out of this total number of households, 3,339 were located in urban areas, 
and 2,407 in rural ones. The survey contains information on household income (salaries, wages) and 
expenditure on food items. Given the large size of the sample and for presentation purposes, we 
grouped household data as follows: 
Households contained in the database were classified according to departments. A 
geographical dimension was critical given the disparities in income and poverty incidence across the 
country. For example, for Beni department, the analysis was based on 412 household questionnaires. 
For Chuquisaca we had 477 questionnaires, and so on. 
 
TABLE 3 
GEOGRAPHICAL GROUPING, 2002 
Department Rural Urban Total % 
1. La Paz 430 789 1 219 21.2 
2. Oruro 239 297 536 9.3 
3. Potosí 350 282 632 11.0 
4. Cochabamba 373 538 911 15.9 
5. Chuquisaca 262 215 477 8.3 
6. Tarija 199 277 476 8.3 
7. Beni 147 265 412 7.2 
8. Pando 95 48 143 2.5 
9. Santa Cruz 320 620 940 16.4 
Total 2 415 3 331 5 746 100 
Source: own classification based on data from the Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (2002). 
                                                        
4
  In turn, household income is defined as the sum of the share in the household’s endowments times the percentage 
change in price of these endowments ( ) ( , ) x ( )
i Endowment
yp r INCOMESHR i r ps r
∈
= ∑  
5
  Due to missing data on household sources of income, 106 questionnaires were excluded from the database. 
Therefore the analysis was based on 5640 questionnaires. 
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Households were grouped into six sextiles of income. The first corresponds to household that 
earned less than or equal to 389.7 Bolivianos per month (Bs/month). Considering the average 
exchange rate in 2002 (1 USD = 6.9 Bolivianos), this amount corresponded to 57 USD/month. In total 
956 questionnaires were included in this income category. The second income group corresponds to 
household who have earned between 389.7 and 694.9 Bs/month (between 57 and 101 USD/month) 
and so on. Currently (September 2009) the average exchange rate is 1 USD = 7 Bolivianos.6 
 
TABLE 4 
INCOME CATEGORY IN THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA, 2002 
Income group (Bs/month) No. of questionnaires % 
Sextile I: <= 390 956 16.7 
Sextile II: 390 - 695 950 16.6 
Sextile III: 695 – 1 033 953 16.7 
Sextile IV: 1 033 – 1 538 953 16.7 
Sextile V: 1 538 – 2 547 953 16.7 
Sextile VI: 2 547 952 16.7 
Total 5 717 100 




EDUCATION STATUS IN THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA, 2002 
Education No. of households Participation(%) 
Literate 4 977 86.6 
Illiterate 769 13.4 
Total 5746 100 
Source: own classification based on data from the Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (2002). 
 
 
Households might have many activities (e.g. get income from farming and from 
manufacturing) build up his/her monthly income. In this classification households were grouped 




Activity Total Percentage 
Agriculture 2 086 36.3 
Capital 1 303 22.7 
Diversified 623 10.8 
Natural resources 764 13.3 
No information 356 6.2 
Non-agriculture 614 10.7 
Total 5 746 100.0 
Source: own classification based on data from the Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (2002). 
.
                                                        
6
  In October 2009, the average exchange rate was 1 dollar  = 7 Bolivianos, which shows a stable exchange rate. 
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VI. Macro-simulation reports 
This section is divided into two main parts. First, we discuss the impacts that the end of trade 
preferences (ATPDEA) would produce on the Bolivian economy. Second, as a policy alternative and 
strategy following the end of the ATPDEA, we then discuss the results from the different scenarios 
that consider a trade agreement between the European Union and the Andean Community, with and 
without the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The simulation scenarios were run employing the data base 
that sets 2008 as the new baseline year (includes all FTAs and modifications of tariffs/preferential 
access that happened in Latin America up this year). 
A. Economic impacts on the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
from the end of trade preferences (ATPDEA) 
The main results of the lost of trade preferences are presented in Table 1. As bilateral tariffs rise for 
both the United States and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Plurinational State of Bolivia main 
economic indicators tend to deteriorate. GDP fells by 0.04 per cent, as well as there are welfare losses 
of 10 million dollars per year. As a result, household income decreases by 0.31 per cent. As trade 
preferences are eliminated, both exports and imports decline. Exports decrease by 0.30 per cent and 
imports by 0.54 per cent. The steeper decline in imports gives a very slight jump to domestic 
production (0.03). Terms of trade get reduced for the Plurinational State of Bolivia by 0.24 per cent. 
TABLE 7 
IMPACTS ON THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA ON THE END OF ATPDEA 
(Percentage changes) 
Economic variable Percentage Change 
GDP -0.04 





Terms of trade -0.24 
Source: Authors based on results from GTAP 7.0 simulations. Variables used from GTAP are GDP (qgdp), 
welfare (EV), income (y), production (qo), exports (qxwreg), imports (qiwreg) and terms of trade (tot). 
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These results are consistent with Telleria et al. (2009), which also discuss the poverty effects 
of the end of the ATPDEA in the Plurinational State of Bolivia. Sectoral effects follow a similar 
pattern as in Telleria et al., and are available from the authors upon request. 
B. A FTA between CAN and the EU:  
Impacts on the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
As we examine the impacts from a full liberalisation between the Andean Community (the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) with the European Union on the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, we observe that there is a slight decrease in GDP for the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia (first column in Table 2). However, the welfare gains associated with this trade 
agreement on Bolivian society amount to US$ 33 million per year. Household income increases by 
almost 2 per cent, and domestic production is not affected. Exports (2.2%), imports (3.6%) and terms 
of trade (1.4%) all improve for the Plurinational State of Bolivia. Overall, there are positive impacts 
on the Plurinational State of Bolivia from full liberalisation. 
As we exclude sensitive products from trade liberalisation for both the Andean Community and 
the European Union (second column in Table 2), the benefits for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
although still positive, decrease slightly. Welfare increases by US$ 25 million per year, and household 
income increase by 1.4 percent. GDP remain unchanged, and exports and imports increase, as well as 
terms of trade. These results show that there is a positive effect on the Plurinational State of Bolivia from 
a trade agreement with the European Union. 
TABLE 8 
IMPACTS ON THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA OF A FTA BETWEEN CAN AND THE EU 
(Percentage changes) 
Economic Variable With Bolivia (Plur. State of) Without Bolivia (Plur. State of) 
FTA CAN-EU FTA CAN-EU  
with sensitives FTA CAN-EU 
FTA CAN-EU 
with sensitives 
GDP -0.01 -0.01 0 0 
Welfare (millions of $US) 33 25 3 -3 
Income 1.92 1.4 0.17 -0.17 
Production 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Exports 2.2 2.0 0.0 -0.0 
Imports 3.6 3.1 0.2 -0.2 
Terms of trade 1.4 1.0 0.1 -0.1 
Source: Authors based on results from GTAP 7.0 simulations. Variables used from GTAP are GDP (qgdp), welfare 
(EV), income (y), production (qo), exports (qxwreg), imports (qiwreg) and terms of trade (tot). 
 
 
In the case where the other member of CAN negotiate a trade agreement with the European 
Union, the benefits are very small (total liberalisation) or even negative (sensitive commodities 
excluded). With full liberalisation the change in GDP is zero and welfare and income increase slightly. 
However, when sensible products are considered, the impacts on the Plurinational State of Bolivia are 
slightly negative, probably due to trade diversion from other CAN members and the EU. These results 
suggest that the Plurinational State of Bolivia would benefit slightly more from a trade agreement with 
the EU, if it negotiates along with the other member of CAN. When the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
is out of the CAN-EU agreement the welfare change is slightly positive or negative. 
1. Changes in exports and imports 
With full liberalisation (with the Plurinational State of Bolivia in the CAN-EU agreement), exports 
increase for most sectors within agriculture and light manufactures, and decrease in mining & natural 
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resources and heavy manufactures (Table 3). Within agriculture and light manufactures, the overall 
Bolivian exportable production of sugar cane, rice and wheat (in this order) and textiles, wood 
products and leather products all increase substantially. These increments are due to a substitution 
effect that impacted over prices of Bolivian products in the EU market. That is, because the EU 
eliminated import tariffs to Bolivian products, along with prices of the other CAN countries, consumer 
prices were reduced in the EU market. 
Within mining and natural resources and heavy manufactures, most of them decrease somewhat 
in scenarios that include the Plurinational State of Bolivia in the trade agreement between CAN and the 
EU. This is because the price of Bolivian commodities did not become much cheaper in comparison with 
the prices of the same commodities exported into the EU from other CAN countries. That is, as the EU 
already charges low import tariffs to Bolivian mining and natural resources and heavy manufactures 
products, when tariff reductions were simulated actually Bolivian prices were not reduced significantly. 
In addition, the Plurinational State of Bolivia benefits from the SGP-Plus, which already grants duty-free 
status to some Bolivian commodities exported to the EU. The difference in prices between Bolivian and 
other EU countries provoked an incentive for EU importers to switch (i.e. substitute) towards importing 
more products from other than the Plurinational State of Bolivia CAN countries. 
When we account for sensitive products, exports decrease for some sectors. However, for 
those sectors which had an increase in exports under full liberalisation, the increase in exports was 
even larger with sensitive products (such as rice, wheat and cereals). This may be due to factor 
reallocation to those sectors which have a comparative advantage in the Plurinational State of Bolivia 




CHANGE IN BOLIVIAN EXPORTS 
Sector 
With Bolivia (Plur. State of) Without Bolivia (Plur. State of)







1. Rice 39.9 53.2 -0.6 2.4 
2. Wheat 38.5 47.0 -2.7 1.7 
3. Cereals 16.3 19.4 -0.9 0.6 
4. Vegetables and Fruits 9.1 -3.0 -3.0 0.9 
5. Oilseeds 0.9 0.0 2.6 0.8 
6. Sugar Cane 58.6 69.2 -2.6 1.3 
7. Plant Based Fibers 
-6.4 -5.2 0.1 0.4 
8. Other Crops 22.4 29.4 -0.9 1.5 
9. Cattle 21.5 24.3 0.9 0.9 
10. Forestry & Fishing 




11. Oil & Coal 
-2.2 -1.8 -0.1 0.2 
12. Gas 
-0.8 -0.7 -0.1 0.0 
13. Mineral Extraction 
-1.4 -1.1 -0.2 0.0 
Light 
manufactures 
14. Meat 8.4 -9.9 -3.3 1.1 
15. Vegetable Oils & Fats 
-2.4 -4.4 1.8 -1.2 
16. Dairy Products 
-27.8 -9.4 -21.3 0.1 
17. Processed Rice 1.9 4.2 -0.6 0.3 
18. Sugar 1.6 -6.1 7.8 -0.6 
(continued) 
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Table 9 (concluded) 
Sector 
With Bolivia (Plur. State of) Without Bolivia (Plur. State of)







19. Other Food 9.5 -5.0 -1.3 -1.0 
20. Beverages & Tobacco 12.7 -3.2 -1.0 -0.3 
21. Textiles 99.1 106.4 -4.0 0.5 
 22. Apparel 11.0 13.5 -1.3 0.4 
 23. Leather Products 32.6 35.9 -1.4 0.3 
 24. Wood Products 65.2 67.9 -0.7 0.6 
 25. Paper Products 11.0 15.3 -3.4 0.3 
Heavy 
manufactures 26. Petroleum Products -1.0 -0.6 -0.1 0.1 
 27. Chemical Products 7.5 10.0 -1.3 0.6 
 28. Mineral Products -7.4 -6.9 -3.3 -3.3 
 29. Ferrous & Non Ferrous Metals 11.1 12.8 -0.7 0.4 
 30. Metal Products -2.9 -0.9 -1.4 0.0 
 31. Motor Vehicles -7.2 -4.9 -1.1 0.7 
 32. Electric Equip. -1.6 1.3 -1.3 0.7 
 33. Machinery & Equip. -7.6 -5.3 -1.7 -0.1 
 34. Other Manufactures -8.1 -6.1 -0.8 0.8 
Source: Authors based on results from GTAP 7.0 simulations. 
 
 
As the Plurinational State of Bolivia does not participate in a trade agreement (in both full 
liberalisation and liberalisation without sensitive commodities), the change in exports is small for 
most sectors, with most of them decreasing or increasing marginally. These reductions are probably 
due to a diversion effect created by the reduction import tariffs that benefited similar commodities 
exported from the other CAN countries.  
In terms of imports, the first point of impact of the reduction in Bolivian import tariffs is 
increased demand for imports from EU into the Plurinational State of Bolivia at the expense of 
imports from the other markets (Table 4). 
 
TABLE 10 
CHANGE IN BOLIVIAN IMPORTS 
(Percentage change) 
Sector 










1. Rice 7.8 3.2 1.7 -1.0 
2. Wheat 2.3 0.9 0.2 -0.2 
3. Cereals 2.6 1.3 0.5 -0.3 
4. Vegetables and Fruits 4.0 1.5 0.6 -0.4 
5. Oilseeds 1.3 -2.9 2.8 -1.6 
(continued) 
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Table 10 (concluded) 
Sector 










6. Sugar Cane 4.5 0.5 2.1 -1.0 
7. Plant Based Fibers 11.7 11.6 0.2 -0.3 
8. Other Crops 11.9 8.2 1.2 -0.9 
9. Cattle 4.3 2.6 0.2 -0.5 
10. Forestry & Fishing 22.5 22.8 0.1 -0.1 
Mining and 
natural resources 
11. Oil & Coal 0.6 0.3 0.2 -0.2 
12. Gas 5.4 4.0 0.1 -1.0 
13. Mineral Extraction 4.6 5.3 -0.3 0.1 
Light 
manufactures 14. Meat 10.7 5.2 1.1 -0.8 
 15. Vegetable Oils & Fats 4.5 2.6 0.9 -0.6 
 16. Dairy Products 8.2 4.6 0.5 -0.3 
 17. Processed Rice 5.1 3.2 0.6 -0.5 
 18. Sugar 0.1 3.5 -3.7 0.0 
 19. Other Food 1.2 0.9 0.1 -0.1 
 20. Beverages & Tobacco 3.8 3.3 0.2 -0.1 
 21. Textiles 4.2 3.9 0.0 -0.1 
 22. Apparel 13.1 12.8 -0.2 -0.2 
 23. Leather Products 9.0 7.0 0.3 -0.3 
 24. Wood Products 23.7 23.7 -0.1 -0.2 
 25. Paper Products 3.4 3.1 0.1 -0.1 
Heavy 
manufactures 26. Petroleum Products 1.3 1.1 0.1 -0.1 
 27. Chemical Products 3.3 3.1 0.1 -0.1 
 28. Mineral Products 6.9 6.3 0.1 -0.2 
 
29. Ferrous & Non Ferrous 
Metals 0.2 0.6 -0.2 0.1 
 30. Metal Products 2.4 2.2 0.1 -0.1 
 31. Motor Vehicles 4.2 3.8 0.1 -0.1 
 32. Electric Equip. 6.3 5.8 0.2 -0.2 
 33. Machinery & Equip. 3.7 3.4 0.1 -0.1 
 34. Other Manufactures 8.1 7.4 0.2 -0.2 
Source: Authors based on results from GTAP 7.0 simulations. 
 
 
With full liberalisation (with the Plurinational State of Bolivia in the CAN-EU agreement), the 
model projected that the volume of Bolivian imports from the EU would grow in all sectors of the 
economy (agriculture, light manufactures, mining & natural resources, and heavy manufactures). 
However, the change imports are not very large except in the case of plant fibers, meat products and 
forestry & fishing (as land-locked country, the Plurinational State of Bolivia would import mostly fish), 
apparel and wood products (such as finished furniture). Two reasons explain the limited growth in 
Bolivian imports: a) some of these commodity groups were already tax-free in the pre-reform scenario, 
and thus prices of EU commodities in the Bolivian market changed moderately; and b) the Bolivian price 
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of aggregated imported commodities did not change significantly because the share of EU commodities 
into the Bolivian market is small (around 8% as shown in Figure 5 below). Both reasons implied a 
relatively small change in the difference of prices by source and aggregated imported prices. 
Under scenarios that simulate no agreement between the Plurinational State of Bolivia and the 
EU (last two columns in Table 4), the model projected negligible growth or marginal declines in the 
volumes of Bolivian imports from the EU. Volume changes on imports as shown in this table can also 
be explained by the different settings of these scenarios. That is, when comparing the scenarios that 
simulate an agreement with the others that simulate an agreement but without the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, the second one imposes quantitative restrictions (i.e. higher tariffs) that are not present in 
the first one (i.e. no tariffs). Such restrictions lower the possibilities of increasing the exchange of 
commodities between the EU and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
2. Production and factor use 
This section addresses changes in aggregated production and factor use in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia. Analysing the domestic production of commodity sectors is important in terms of 
understanding the general equilibrium demand response simulated in GTAP. Changes in aggregated 
production refer to total production increased or decreased in the Plurinational State of Bolivia as a 
result of CAN-EU trade reforms (with or without the Plurinational State of Bolivia). Table 5 shows 
that as some exports increase under full liberalisation, so does production. With full liberalisation the 
model projected the production of Bolivian commodities (which includes domestically consumed and 
exported commodities) decreased in most mining & extraction of natural resource and heavy 
manufactures, and increased in most agriculture commodities and light manufactures.  
The most noticeable result is observed in the domestic production of textiles and wood 
products that increased 51.4 and 22.6% annually respectively. This effect is even larger under the 
scenario with sensitive products, where there is a larger increase in production for those sectors. The 
driving forces behind these growths were increments in the production of goods for the domestic and 
goods oriented to international markets. However, the production of some commodity groups also 
decreased. For example electric equipment and oil seeds decreased (10% and 2.3% per year 
respectively), which is explained by reductions in domestic production oriented to international 
markets and a drop in local production oriented to the domestic market.  
In general total production of commodity sectors decreased slightly in scenario where the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia is out of the CAN-EU trade agreement (next to the last column in Table 5). 
Yet, few sectors such as oils seeds and sugar cane increased marginally due to a small expansion in 
exportable production, and a modest contraction in production of domestically traded commodities. In 
the last scenario (FTA CAN-EU with sensible - last column in Table 5), the model projected null or 
minor increments in all domestic production of tradables and non-tradables (‘Agriculture’, ‘Mining and 
natural resources’, ‘Light manufactures’ and ‘Heavy manufactures’), due to small expansions in both 
domestic production for the local and international markets. In general, for those scenarios where the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia does not participate in a FTA, production changes are small or negligible. 
 
TABLE 11 
CHANGE IN PRODUCTION IN BOLIVIAN SECTORS 
(Percentage change) 
Sector 










1. Rice -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
2. Wheat -2.2 -0.9 -0.3 0.2 
3. Cereals 0.4 0.6 -0.1 0.0 
(continued) 
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Table 11 (concluded) 
Sector 










4. Vegetables and Fruits 0.9 -0.5 -0.4 0.1 
5. Oilseeds -2.3 -3.6 1.5 -0.7 
6. Sugar Cane 0.6 -0.6 1.1 -0.1 
7. Plant Based Fibers 1.9 3.3 -0.3 0.3 
8. Other Crops 1.7 2.5 -0.1 0.2 
9. Cattle 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 
10. Forestry & Fishing 8.0 8.4 -0.1 0.1 
Mining and natural 
resources 
11. Oil & Coal -0.8 -0.7 0.0 0.1 
12. Gas -0.8 -0.7 -0.1 0.0 
13. Mineral Extraction 0.3 0.8 -0.2 0.1 
Light manufactures 
14. Meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
15. Vegetable Oils & Fats -2.3 -4.0 1.6 -1.1 
16. Dairy Products -2.5 -1.2 -1.2 0.0 
17. Processed Rice -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
18. Sugar 0.1 -1.8 1.9 -0.1 
19. Other Food -0.8 -2.2 -0.3 0.0 
20. Beverages & Tobacco 0.1 -0.7 -0.1 0.0 
21. Textiles 51.4 56.1 -2.3 0.3 
22. Apparel 3.1 3.9 -0.3 0.1 
23. Leather Products 6.2 7.6 -0.4 0.2 
24. Wood Products 21.6 22.6 -0.2 0.2 
25. Paper Products -3.6 -3.1 -0.2 0.1 
26. Petroleum Products -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 
27. Chemical Products -5.0 -4.3 -0.2 0.1 
28. Mineral Products -2.4 -2.2 -0.1 -0.1 
29. Ferrous & Non Ferrous Metals 5.9 7.2 -0.6 0.3 
30. Metal Products -5.2 -4.3 -0.5 0.0 
31. Motor Vehicles -6.4 -5.3 -0.5 0.4 
32. Electric Equip. -10.0 -8.8 -0.5 0.4 
33. Machinery & Equip. -7.6 -6.0 -1.1 0.1 
34. Other Manufactures -6.2 -4.9 -0.5 0.5 
Source: Authors based on results from GTAP 7.0 simulations. 
 
 
Finally, changes in factor use (land, labour and capital) are small. With full liberalisation, 
within agriculture there is factor reallocation between oilseeds and other sectors, as oilseeds use less 
land (-0.5%), while other sectors use more land, labour and capital. This is mainly due to the decline 
in production of oilseeds. With liberalisation with sensible products, there is a similar pattern, but with 
less factor use in oilseeds and sugar cane. Outside agriculture, there is a slight increase in factor use 
for almost all sectors. 
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C. Tariff revenues 
As pointed out by an IMF (2005) report, a subject that has been frequently ignored in trade 
liberalisation studies is the issue of the loss in government revenues when import tariffs are 
eliminated. CGE models like GTAP are, for the time being, unable to account for how tariff revenues 
are replaced with other sources of revenue for the government. However, the tariff structure for the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia in the GTAP database shows that the Plurinational State of Bolivia is a 
fairly open economy. This reflects the process of unilateral tariff reduction that the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia underwent during the structural adjustment program implemented in the late eighties and 
early nineties. Thus when tariff reductions were simulated under different scenarios in GTAP, the 
grade of modifications in the tariff structure of the Plurinational State of Bolivia was not substantial. 
Additionally, Bolivian custom office collected (in 2008) about 1000 million dollars from 
import tariffs worldwide. Out of this amount, about US$ 300 million was collected from firms that 
imported goods from the European Union. 7 In 2008, these US$ 300 million represented 2.3% of the 
Bolivian government total expenditure. In the case of a the Plurinational State of Bolivia-EU trade 
agreement, the potential 2.3% loss in fiscal income for the government of the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia will have to be covered from domestic taxes or other sources. 
Considering that the share of Bolivian imports from the EU has not been large (7% in average 
between 2004 and 2008 as shown in Figure 3), we believe that the importance of the EU is in terms of 
tariff revenues would not be growing. In addition, the Plurinational State of Bolivia imports from the 
EU capital goods such as machinery (both new and second hand trucks, agricultural equipment), oils, 
lubricants, textiles (e.g. jerseys, cardigans), medicines, etc which in turn are used as inputs for the 
production of other final goods. Therefore, the production sector might actually benefit from tariff 
elimination. However, this is a subject that needs to be addressed more carefully, and which is out of 
the scope of this research. 
                                                        
7
 Eduardo Rojas, personal communication. Mr. Rojas is the General Manager of the Regional Customs 
Administration in Cochabamba, The Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
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VII. Micro-simulation results 
This section presents results from the application to the macro-micro simulation approach as described 
in previous section. Results provide insights into the impact of the different trade scenarios across the 
various household classifications. This analysis has taken into account the fact that once domestic 
prices change due to an external factor (such as elimination of import tariffs), prices of commodities 
might not immediately be transmitted to the different rural and urban areas of a given region/country. 
In the case of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, we have estimated these coefficients (Annex 7) to 
allow for price adjustment in less connected markets and low populated areas. The main markets (well 
connected and relatively more populated) were La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, where it was 
assumed a unitary price transmission; while the less connected markets were Beni, Chuquisaca, Oruro, 
Pando, Potosí and Tarija which had different transmission coefficients as shown in Annex 7. 
The analysis of the impacts of alternative trade reforms on household economic wellbeing 
involves computing the private utility equation as defined in Section 5.4. This equation uses the 
resulting price and return to factor changes (generated by GTAP), weighted by price transmission 
coefficients, for the computation of the difference between Laspeyres index for income and Laspeyres 
index for expenditure, so producing an estimation of the post-reform private utility at pre-reform 
quantities. The Laspeyres indices were subsequently normalised to a value of 100 in the base year, to 
indicate the percentage change in income and expenditure across household classifications. In this 
investigation we have referred to this process as ‘macro-micro simulation approach’. 
A. Changes in prices 
Table 12 shows that, as expected, import prices from the EU into the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
would decrease as a result of a FTA CAN EU. However, domestic prices in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia would actually increase in this scenario, and in scenario “FTA CAN – EU, no sensitives” and 
“FTA CAN – EU, no the Plurinational State of Bolivia” (though price increments in this last one are 
marginal. On the contrary, domestic prices would decrease under the last scenario (“FTA CAN – EU, 
no the Plurinational State of Bolivia, no sensitives”). 
Why is that domestic prices in the Plurinational State of Bolivia increase in the first scenario? 
With trade liberalization and reduced tariffs, prices are expected to decrease. However, there are general 
equilibrium impacts that are captured by the model.  
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TABLE 12 
SIMULATION EFFECTS ON COMMODITY PRICES AND PRODUCTION FACTORS 
(Percentage changes) 
Commodity 
With Bolivia (Plur. State of) Without Bolivia (Plur. State of) 
FTA CAN-EU FTA CAN-EU  
with sensitives 
FTA CAN-EU FTA CAN-EU  
with sensitives 
1. Rice 2.1 0.9 0.4 -0.3 
2. Wheat 1.6 1.1 0.2 -0.2 
3. Cereals 2.2 1.1 0.4 -0.3 
4. Vegetables and Fruits 2.3 0.9 0.3 -0.3 
5. Oilseeds 1.6 0.3 0.6 -0.4 
6. Sugar Cane 1.8 0.8 0.4 -0.2 
7. Plant Based Fibers 1.8 1.2 0.2 -0.2 
8. Other Crops 2.5 1.3 0.4 -0.3 
9. Cattle 1.9 0.9 0.4 -0.3 
10. Forestry & Fishing 8.0 8.0 0.1 -0.1 
11. Oil & Coal 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 
12. Gas 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.1 
13. Mineral Extraction 2.1 1.9 0.0 -0.1 
14. Meat 2.0 1.2 0.2 -0.2 
15. Vegetable Oils & Fats 1.4 0.5 0.5 -0.3 
16. Dairy Products 1.9 1.4 0.2 -0.2 
17. Processed Rice 1.9 1.2 0.2 -0.2 
18. Sugar 1.8 1.3 0.2 -0.2 
19. Other Food 1.6 0.9 0.3 -0.2 
20. Beverages & Tobacco 1.7 1.3 0.1 -0.1 
21. Textiles 1.6 1.3 0.1 -0.1 
22. Apparel 1.7 1.3 0.1 -0.1 
23. Leather Products 1.7 1.3 0.1 -0.1 
24. Wood Products 3.2 2.9 0.1 -0.1 
25. Paper Products 1.4 1.0 0.1 -0.1 
26. Petroleum Products 0.6 0.5 0.1 -0.1 
27. Chemical Products 1.6 1.3 0.1 -0.1 
28. Mineral Products 1.9 1.6 0.1 -0.1 
29. Ferrous & Non Ferrous Metals 1.9 1.7 0.0 -0.1 
30. Metal Products 1.4 1.1 0.1 -0.1 
31. Motor Vehicles 1.6 1.3 0.1 -0.1 
32. Electric Equipment 1.7 1.3 0.1 -0.1 
33. Machinery & Equipment 1.5 1.2 0.1 -0.1 
34. Other Manufactures 1.3 1.0 0.1 -0.1 
35. Services 1.8 1.5 0.1 -0.1 
Land 1.7 -2.9 1.7 -1.0 
Unskilled labour 2.5 2.0 0.2 -0.2 
Skilled labour 2.1 1.8 0.1 -0.1 
Capital 2.4 2.0 0.1 -0.1 
Natural Resources -0.7 0.3 -0.3 0.2 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on results from GTAP 7.0 simulations. 
 
 
The EU represents for most products in the Plurinational State of Bolivia for less than 10% of 
total imports. Brazil, Argentina and ROW represent most of the share of imports.  Exports to the EU, 
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Ecuador and most products of Colombia increase, while for all other partners decreases. In relative 
terms, the prices that the Plurinational State of Bolivia pays for these imports from the EU fell relative 
to imports of other countries. However, relative prices of products from Andean partners, especially 
Colombia and Ecuador increase for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, relative to the price of other 
imports. Therefore, the overall impact in the Plurinational State of Bolivia in the first scenario is 
increased domestic prices.  
Under the third and fourth scenarios (“FTA CAN – EU, no Plurinational State of Bolivia” and 
“FTA CAN – EU, no Plurinational State of Bolivia, no sensitives” respectively), percentage changes 
in most commodity prices were projected to be either positive or negative, but negligible. This is 
because in these scenarios it is simulated that the Plurinational State of Bolivia is out of the trade 
agreement, while changes in prices are due to changes in import tariffs from both the EU and other 
than the Plurinational State of Bolivia CAN countries.  
The effect of the simulations on the income side resulted in mixed results for Bolivian 
production factors (bottom part of Table 6). While increments were projected in returns to unskilled 
labour, skilled labour and capital under the first two scenarios, reductions were projected in natural 
resources for the first scenario, and in land for the second scenario. In the case of the last two 
scenarios (where the Plurinational State of Bolivia is out of the agreement) the model projected 
marginal increments or reductions in all production factors, except in the case of land that increased 
under the third scenario.  
The negative results in natural resources and land are basically explained by their sluggish 
feature which means that both resources are virtually fixed in the economy. Therefore, when demand 
for these resources decrease, their prices do so (given that their supply is almost perfectly inelastic). In 
the first and third scenario the model projected an increase in the demand for land, which lead to an 
increase in its relative price. GTAP model assumes that unskilled and skilled labour and capital are 
mobile factors in the economy. With growing demand for the three of them in the first three scenarios, 
the model projected increased prices. 
B. Changes in private utility 
Table 13 presents the impacts of the trade reforms on households’ private utility by department. In 
general the results indicate that private utility would increase for households under the first two 
scenarios (FTA CAN-EU with the Plurinational State of Bolivia), and would decrease or remain 
changeless under the last two scenarios (FTA CAN-EU, but without the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia). The moderate changes in household private utility reflect the rather small changes in 
commodity prices and returns to production factors estimated by the CGE model (Table 12). This 
outcome is not surprising given the relatively small rates of protection the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia has been applying to EU products and to the relatively small share EU products into Bolivian 
markets.Considering the effect on private utility by region, Chart 7 shows that the urban households 
benefit more than those the rural department and rural/urban condition shows that urban households 
tend to benefit more than rural ones under Scenario 1 (FTA CAN-EU). In La Paz and Cochabamba 
departments private utility is estimated to be negative, though small. The Annex 6 presents the values 
of private utility for the other three scenarios. In general terms, prívate utility tends to be positive for 
urban areas and negative in rural areas. 
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TABLE 13 
HOUSEHOLD PRIVATE UTILITY BY LIBERALISATION SCENARIO AND DEPARTMENT 
(Changes) 
Departament 
With Bolivia (Plur. State of) No Bolivia (Plur. State of) 
FTA CAN-EU FTA CAN-EU,  
no sensitives FTA CAN-EU 
FTA CAN-EU,  
no sensitives 
Beni 0.24 0.60 -0.12 0.05 
Chuquisaca 0.24 0.43 -0.57 0.02 
Cochabamba 0.16 0.59 -0.14 0.07 
La Paz 0.12 0.54 -0.15 0.07 
Oruro 0.28 0.69 -0.13 0.06 
Pando 0.11 -0.14 0.04 -0.03 
Potosí 0.25 0.57 -0.11 0.05 
Santa Cruz 0.19 0.64 -0.15 0.07 
Tarija 0.24 0.67 -0.14 0.06 
Total 0.20 0.59 -0.14 0.06 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on results from micro-simulations. 







































































Source: Authors’ estimations based on results from micro-simulations. 
 
 
These results indicate that the micro-simulation model has computed increased returns to 
production factors that overcame higher prices of commodities. I.e., values of the Laspeyres index for 
income were greater than values of the Laspeyres index for expenditure. With increased prices of 
commodities, households’ expenditure on their consumption bundle became more costly. In the case 
of urban households, such higher costs were covered by even higher returns to production factors, 
resulting in a net positive benefit for them (reflected on positive private utility values). In the case of 
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rural households higher costs of the consumption bundle were marginally covered by higher income, 
or were not in the case of rural households from La Paz and Cochabamba rural areas.  
The micro-simulation model shows a harmful situation for rural households who would not 
benefit in general from the different CAN-EU trade agreements. At first sight this is not as dramatic as 
it looks like given that changes in welfare are not large. Yet, considering households in rural areas of 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia are the poorest in the country, minor changes in welfare might mean 
difficulties for the most vulnerable ones.  
Another perspective is given by Table 14, which summarises results of household private 
utility by income group. As a consequence of the CAN – EU liberalisation reforms with and without 
sensitive commodities (first two scenarios), the private utilities of households included in the income 
category ‘389.71 – 694.95’ Bs/month and above are projected to increase, while the private utility of 
the poorest household income group (‘<= 389.7’) is projected to either decrease (Scenario 2) or 
insignificantly increase (Scenario 1).  
Under the third scenario (trade agreement without the Plurinational State of Bolivia), the 
private utility of all household groups (except the poorest income group) is projected to increase. 
Under the fourth scenario (no Plurinational State of Bolivia, no sensitive commodities), the opposite is 
projected. That is, only the private utility of household heads belonging to the poorest income 
category (Sextile I) is projected to be negative, while the private utilities of the rest of the income 
groups are projected to negligible increase. 
 
TABLE 14 
PRIVATE UTILITY BY PER LIBERALISATION SCENARIO AND INCOME CATEGORY 
(Percentage change) 
Income category (Bs/month) 
 
With Bolivia (Plur. State of) Without Bolivia (Plur. State of) 
FTA CAN-EU FTA CAN-EU,  
no sensitives 
FTA CAN-EU FTA CAN-EU,  
no sensitives 
Sextile I: <= 390 0.08 -0.69 0.25 -0.14 
Sextile II: 390 - 695 0.21 0.56 -0.13 0.05 
Sextile III: 695 – 1,033 0.22 0.59 -0.14 0.06 
Sextile IV: 1,033 – 1,538 0.22 0.63 -0.15 0.07 
Sextile V: 1,538 – 2,547 0.20 0.64 -0.15 0.07 
Sextile VI: > 2,547 0.21 0.64 -0.15 0.07 
Total 0.20 0.59 -0.14 0.06 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on results from micro-simulations. 
Note: Due to missing data on household sources of income, 106 questionnaires were excluded from the database. 
Therefore analysis was done based on 5640 questionnaires.  
     To reduce the impact of extreme values of private utility, the median was used instead of the mean. 
 
Figure 8, which shows the results that combine information on households’ education group, 
production factors and private utility level for Scenario 2 (FTA CAN – EU, no sensitives) confirms 
that the most vulnerable households (i.e. depending mainly on agriculture for their livelihoods) would 
be worst-off as a result of a trade agreement with the EU. Households depending on the rest of 
production factor categories (capital, natural resources, non-agriculture and diversified resources) 
would be better-off. Annex 8 shows the changes in private utility for the four scenarios. Generally, 
scenarios that simulate a trade agreement with the Plurinational State of Bolivia included are the most 
advantageous for Bolivian households (except in the cases of households that obtain a significant 
share of their income from agricultural activities). The results are irrespective of the literacy in the 
households as both tend to gain with the agreement, except again in the case of those households that 
get most of their income from agriculture.  
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Overall results support the conclusion that households in the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
would suffer from not signing into an FTA with the European Union. Nonetheless, FTAs also have 
unintended consequences especially for the poorest and rural households. Therefore the government 
should consider implementing compensatory policies if decides to engage into a trade agreement with 
the EU. Complementarily, Page (2008) suggests that countries should not assume that trade 
agreements alone will automatically generate development benefits, and that the evidence from Latin 
America advocates for introducing complementary policies both directly and indirectly. 
FIGURE 8 
PRIVATE UTILITY BY PRODUCTION FACTOR AND EDUCATION GROUP 
(Percentage change) 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on results from micro-simulations. 
 
The combined macro-micro results suggest that economic growth could contribute to poverty 
reduction. In general, there seems to be some agreement on the positive effects of economic growth on 
poverty reduction. For example, Giordano (2009) reports that according to the World Development 
Report 2001 a value of two is observed in developing countries in the elasticity of income to poverty 
reduction. That is, a one percent increase in real income reduces headcount poverty by two percent. 
Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) suggest that, in the long-run, returns to skill labour have risen in Mexico 
as a result of trade liberalisation in the late 80s and early 90s. In Colombia, which reduced also 
drastically tariffs in early 90s, returns to skilled labour also increased due to an increase in the demand 
for skilled workers (Attanasio et al., 2003). Winters (2003) reports that trade liberalisation was 
associated with a marked acceleration in formal employment creation. 
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VIII. Conclusions and recommendations 
The core conclusion of this research is that a CAN – EU trade agreement that includes the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia is a superior alternative to maintaining the status quo. This conclusion 
draws from the most important findings of sections 6 and 7. While Section 6 placed the first two 
scenarios (both of them include the Plurinational State of Bolivia in the agreement, with one of them 
excluding sensitive commodities) as the most profitable trade setting for the Bolivian economy as a 
whole, Section 7 found that such scenarios that were the most advantageous trade setting where 
benefits would be distributed across most household groups of Bolivian society. The scenarios that 
exclude the Plurinational State of Bolivia from the CAN – EU trade agreement were repetitively 
projected to be the worst trading picture for both the Bolivian macroeconomic performance and the 
economic wellbeing of its households. 
At a household level, the micro-simulation model projected that the economy-wide trade 
liberalisation settings resulted in higher benefits for most household groups, while the scenarios that 
simulate a trade agreement but without the Plurinational State of Bolivia, private utility tends to be 
negative or marginally positive. Yet, compensatory or complementary policies are recommended for 
the poorest income groups if the Plurinational State of Bolivia decides to engage into a trade 
agreement with the EU. 
We recognise that trade reforms by themselves do not achieve substantive changes in poverty 
reduction. We would recommend carrying them out in association with macroeconomic stabilization 
policies, deregulation, technological improvement policies, and other policies that fit better for the 
domestic development.  
We consider that the Plurinational State of Bolivia should not remain apart from the 
liberalisation processes that characterise the current globalised economy. The other CAN countries 
(Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) already started negotiations with the EU towards a trade agreement. If 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia is unable to make the EU to lower its domestic tariffs for Bolivian 
products, it will lose competitiveness in comparison with Colombian, Ecuadorian and Peruvian goods 
and services as EU import tariffs for them will be reduced or eliminated. To keep its market share the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia has to react implementing a trade policy that will keeps open market 
niches for Bolivian products.  
The Plurinational State of Bolivia already applies low tariffs to EU goods. As it was 
mentioned, such low tariffs are associated to the fact that right after the structural adjustment program 
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that involved a process of unilateral tariff reduction, the Plurinational State of Bolivia became a fairly 
open economy. Therefore, the sacrifice the government would have to do would not be huge, and 
there is more to gain in terms of access to the EU market than to lose in terms of tariff elimination. 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia already left itself out of the agreement with the US (the largest 
importer in the world), and now has to consider carefully if it is really convenient to be once more out 
of a trade agreement with an important market like the EU (the second largest importer in the world). 
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Annexes




CHANGE IN TARIFFS AFTER THE END OF ATPDEA 
Sector 
Bolivia’s applied tariffs on 
imports from the United States 
United States’ applied tariffs on 






ATPDEA After ATPDEA 
1. Rice 0 10 0 0 
2. Wheat 10 10 0 0 
3. Cereals 10 15 0 0 
4. Vegetables and Fruits 10 10 0 20 
5. Oilseeds 10 10 0 0 
6. Sugar Cane 0 20 0 0 
7. Plant Based Fibers 10 10 0 0 
8. Other Crops 10 10 0 0 
9. Cattle 10 10 0 0 
10. Forestry & Fishing 10 10 0 0 
11. Oil & Coal 0 10 0,4 0 
12. Gas 10 10 0 0 
13. Mineral Extraction 10 10 0 0 
14. Meat 10 10 0 4,5 
15. Vegetable Oils & Fats 10 10 0 0 
16. Dairy Products 10 10 0 14,5 
17. Processed Rice 10 10 0 0 
18. Sugar 10 10 0 0 
19. Other Food 10 20 0 4,5 
20. Beverages & Tobacco 10 10 0 0 
21. Textiles 10 35 0 4,2 
22. Apparel 10 20 0 0 
23. Leather Products 10 10 4,6 4,6 
24. Wood Products 10 35 0 0 
25. Paper Products 7,9 10 0 0 
26. Petroleum Products 10 10 0,6 0,6 
27. Chemical Products 10 15 0 0 
28. Mineral Products 10 10 0 0 
29. Ferrous & Non Ferrous Metals 9,6 10 0 5,5 
30. Metal Products 9,6 10 0 5,5 
31. Motor Vehicles 8,4 10 0 0 
32. Electric Equipment 10 10 0 0 
33. Machinery & Equipment 5,3 10 0 0 
34. Other Manufactures 10 10 0 0 
35. Services 0 0 0 0 
Source: Aduana de Bolivia, 2009 (http://www.cnda.net.bo); GTAP 7.0 Data Base; and USITC - United States 
International Trade Commission (http://hts.usitc.gov - Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, 2009). 




CHANGE IN TARIFFS AFTER TOTAL LIBERALISATION OF TRADE WITH THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (SCENARIO 2) 
Sector 
Bolivia’s applied tariffs on 
imports from the European 
Union 
European Union’s applied tariffs on 
imports from Bolivia (Plur.State of) 
 
Before After Before After 
1. Rice 0 0 10 0 
2. Wheat 9,94 9,94 10 0 
3. Cereals 0 0 15 0 
4. Vegetables and Fruits 4,72 0 10 10 
5. Oilseeds 6,73 6,73 10 0 
6. Sugar Cane 0 0 20 0 
7. Plant Based Fibers 0 0 10 0 
8. Other Crops 9,64 0 10 0 
9. Cattle 5,64 0 10 0 
10. Forestry & Fishing 6,35 0 10 0 
11. Oil & Coal 0 0 10 0 
12. Gas 0 0 10 0 
13. Mineral Extraction 9,73 0 10 0 
14. Meat 5,09 5,09 10 10 
15. Vegetable Oils & Fats 9,79 0 10 0 
16. Dairy Products 8,56 8,56 10 10 
17. Processed Rice 6,7 0 10 0 
18. Sugar 1,32 1,32 10 10 
19. Other Food 9,72 0 20 20 
20. Beverages & Tobacco 9,86 0 10 10 
21. Textiles 9,45 9,45 35 0 
22. Apparel 7,74 0 20 0 
23. Leather Products 7,98 7,98 10 0 
24. Wood Products 9,43 0 35 0 
25. Paper Products 7,61 0 10 0 
26. Petroleum Products 9,54 0 10 0 
27. Chemical Products 10 0 15 0 
28. Mineral Products 9,92 0 10 0 
29. Ferrous & Non Ferrous Metals 9,52 0 10 0 
30. Metal Products 9,71 0 10 0 
31. Motor Vehicles 6,91 0 10 0 
32. Electric Equipment 9,84 0 10 0 
33. Machinery & Equipment 5,53 0 10 0 
34. Other Manufactures 9,68 0 10 0 
35. Services 0 0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ classification based on results from GTAP 7.0 simulations. 
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Annex 3 
Cointegration analysis to measure market integration 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
A basic requirement to undertake a cointegration analysis consists of ensuring that time series 
data are not stationary and that exhibit an alike-integration order. A time series is defined as non-
stationary when it does not display a trend to regress to its own mean (in addition its variance tends to 
grow on time). Alternatively, a time series is stationary if the mean, variance and autocovariance (at 
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We use ADF test to determine if time series are not stationary. 
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Where ∆Yt-1 is the first differential of the variable (lagged one period); t is the time or trend 
variable; i is the number of lags; v the error term; β1 is the intercept (constant); and δ and α are the 
parameters to be estimated. The null hypothesis is δ=0 which means that there is a unit root (the 
alternative hypothesis is that δ < 0). If the absolute value statistic τ exceeds the critical absolute values 
of the ADF test, then we reject the null hypothesis (δ=0). Thus, the time series is stationary as it does 
not exhibit a unitary root.  
If a time series has been differentiated once and is stationary, then we can say that the original 
series is integrated of order one, denoted as I(1). If the original time series is differentiated twice to 
make it stationary, then it is said that the original time series is integrated of order two, or I(2). 
Obviously, if d=0 then I(0), and we have a stationary time series. Pesaran et al. (1997) recommends 
estimating the ADF test with a specific number of lags. The number of lags is important in finite time 
series. 
Akaike and Schwartz criterion 
The structure of the minimum classification error (MCE) is closely related with the Vector 
Autoregression (VAR). Thus, the number of lags used to estimate VAR is kept in the estimation of the 
MCE model. The selection of the lags is done using jointly the Akaike information Criterion (AIC) 








M nAIC n Ln
T













Where n is the number of parameters in the statistical model, T is the number of observations 
(fixed); M is the number of variables in the system; and 
n
∞
∑  is the matrix of residuals. 
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Johansen cointegration test 
Two time series are cointegrated, thus displaying a long term relationship, if these time series 
are integrated of order I(1). That is, they become stationary when differentiated once, and exists an 
stationary time series that is a linear combination of order I(0). In practice, this relationship is 
estimated through a regression between the dependent variable and several explanatory variables (that 
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Where Yt is the dependent variable; δ0 and δt are long-term parameters; Xit are explanatory 
variables; and µ is the long-term error 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
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Where ∆Yt denotes the first difference in the dependent variable; α, β and γ are parameters to 
be estimated; µ is the error term; m represents the number of lags; ε represents cointegration vectors; 
Φt coefficients of speed adjustment, that capture how fast the variables adjust towards equilibrium 
once the shock has occurred (the larger the coefficient, the faster the response). 
If in one or more equations, the adjustment coefficients are statistically equal to zero, the 
dependent variable of that equation does not respond to disequilibrium. If the coefficient displays a 





AVAILABILITY OF PRICE DATA FOR SELECTED PRODUCTS AND CITIES IN THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA 
 Cochabamba La Paz Santa Cruz Sucre Tarija Oruro 




















Fernández Tagarete Bolívar 
Oil x       x x  x x  x  
Rice x    x     x x x   x 
Paddy rice x    x     x x x   x 
Pea x     x   x  x x x  x 
Pepper x    x    x  x x  x  
Sugar x   x     x  x x  x  
Bean x  x x  x   x  x x x   
Maize x  x  x    x  x x x   
Wheat   x  x    x  x x x   
Flour x    x    x  x x x   
Apple  x      x x  x x   x 
Peanut x    x    x  x x x   
Lemon x       x x  x x x x  
Tomato x   x  x   x  x x x   
Onion x  x x  x   x  x x x   
Corn x   x  x   x  x x x   
Potato flour x    x    x  x x x   
Banana  x      x x  x x x   
Orange  x      x x  x x x   
Lettuce x   x  x   x  x x x   
Carrot x  x   x   x  x x x   
Butter x       x x  x x x   
Pork x   x     x  x x   x 
Lamb x   x     x  x x   x 
Red meat x   x     x  x x   x 
Poultry x       x x  x x   x 
Fish x      x  x  x x x   
Cheese x       x x  x x x   
Tuber  x    x   x  x x x   
Potato  x    x   x  x x x   
Yuca x        x  x x x   
Quinua x        x  x x x   
Coca x       x x  x x x   















































GTAP CHANGES IN PRICES OF GOODS AND IN THE PRICE TRANSMISSION 
COEFFICIENTS 
Sector 









(Plur. State of) 
FTA CAN-EU,  
excl. Bolivia 






Oil 1.59 0.29 0.62 -0.39 0.68 0.96 
Pepper 1.59 0.29 0.62 -0.39 0.98 1.11 
Pea 1.59 0.29 0.62 -0.39 1.11 0.89 
Rice 2.10 0.92 0.40 -0.29 0.97 0.97 
Tuna, sardine 7.98 7.95 0.06 -0.09 0.61 0.68 
Sugar 1.78 1.30 0.17 -0.15 0.93 0.96 
Alcoholic bev. 1.68 1.27 0.13 -0.14 1.00 1.00 
Onion 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 0.92 0.82 
Pork 1.93 0.85 0.36 -0.27 1.00 0.86 
Cereals 2.19 1.12 0.36 -0.27 0.97 0.95 
Corn 1.43 0.45 0.46 -0.30 0.75 0.80 
Chuño 1.79 1.16 0.23 -0.17 0.99 1.00 
Coca 2.45 1.34 0.40 -0.27 1.12 0.89 
Cocoa 2.45 1.34 0.40 -0.27 1.12 0.89 
Spices 2.45 1.34 0.40 -0.27 1.00 1.00 
Lamb 1.93 0.85 0.36 -0.27 0.90 0.95 
Cold cuts 1.97 1.24 0.24 -0.20 1.00 0.84 
Noodles 1.59 0.93 0.26 -0.20 1.00 1.00 
Soft drinks 1.68 1.27 0.13 -0.14 1.00 1.00 
Bean 2.45 1.34 0.40 -0.27 0.95 0.71 
Flour 1.59 0.93 0.26 -0.20 1.10 1.20 
Liver 1.97 1.24 0.24 -0.20 1.00 0.84 
Eggs 1.88 1.35 0.17 -0.16 0.94 1.02 
Juices 1.68 1.27 0.13 -0.14 1.00 1.00 
Milk 1.88 1.35 0.17 -0.16 1.00 1.00 
Powder milk 1.88 1.35 0.17 -0.16 1.00 1.00 
Lettuce 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 0.73 0.93 
Lemon 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 1.00 1.00 
Maize 2.19 1.12 0.36 -0.27 0.97 0.95 
Peanut 1.43 0.45 0.46 -0.30 1.05 1.06 
Butter 1.88 1.35 0.17 -0.16 0.99 0.15 
Apple 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 1.06 1.03 
Jam 1.59 0.93 0.26 -0.20 1.00 1.00 
Honey 1.59 0.93 0.26 -0.20 1.00 1.00 
Orange 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 1.00 1.00 
Oca 1.79 1.16 0.23 -0.17 0.95 1.02 
Other meats 1.93 0.85 0.36 -0.27 1.00 0.84 
(continued) 
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Sector 








FTA CAN-EU,  
excl. Bolivia 






Other fruits 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 0.94 0.93 
Other dairy 
products 
1.88 1.35 0.17 -0.16 1.00 1.00 
Other fish 7.98 7.95 0.06 -0.09 0.61 0.68 
Other refresh. 1.68 1.27 0.13 -0.14 1.00 1.00 
Other tubercule 1.79 1.16 0.23 -0.17 1.00 1.00 
Other vegetables 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 0.94 0.93 
Bread 1.59 0.93 0.26 -0.20 1.00 1.00 
Potato 1.79 1.16 0.23 -0.17 1.00 1.00 
Papaya 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 1.00 1.00 
Fish 7.98 7.95 0.06 -0.09 0.61 0.68 
Banana 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 1.00 1.00 
Plantains 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 1.00 1.00 
Chicken 1.93 0.85 0.36 -0.27 0.96 1.00 
Cheese 1.88 1.35 0.17 -0.16 1.00 1.00 
Quinoa 2.19 1.12 0.36 -0.27 0.95 0.97 
Soft drinks 1.68 1.27 0.13 -0.14 1.00 0.98 
Salt 1.59 0.93 0.26 -0.20 1.00 1.00 
Tea, coffee 2.45 1.34 0.40 -0.27 1.00 1.00 
Tomato 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 0.94 0.93 
Wheat 1.60 1.06 0.22 -0.18 1.00 0.93 
Bovie meat 1.97 1.24 0.24 -0.20 1.00 0.84 
Cassava 1.79 1.16 0.23 -0.17 1.01 0.96 
Carrot 2.32 0.87 0.34 -0.27 0.76 0.99 
Source: Authors based on Eviews econometric estimations.  
 
 
This  table shows the 60 products that represent the typical hosehold’s consumption basket in 
the database described in section 5.4. The first four columns show the percent change in prices as a 
result of the GTAP model, mapped to the products in the basket. As mentioned in section 7, we have 
assumed that the domestic markets that are better connected to international markets are La Paz, Santa 
Cruz and Cochabamba. The least connected domestic markets are Beni, Chuquisaca, Oruro, Pando, 
Potosí and Tarija. For these we estimated price transmission coefficients, shown in the last two 
columns of the table. Based on these coefficients, we modified the GTAP price estimates to show that 
the connected areas least connected to international markets are also less exposed to changes in 









PRIVATE UTILITY BY DEPARTMENT AND BY RURAL AND URBAN CONDITION 





FTA CAN – 
EU, no Bolivia 
(Plur. State of) 
FTA CAN – EU, no 
Bolivia (Plur. State 
of), no sensitives 
Beni 
Rural 138 0.13 -0.95 0.40 -0.22 
Urban 254 0.26 0.70 -0.14 0.07 
Chuquisaca 
Rural 262 0.07 -1.42 0.51 -0.28 
Urban 211 0.32 0.79 -0.16 0.07 
Cochabamba 
Rural 371 -0.02 -0.3 0.33 -0.19 
Urban 528 0.21 0.71 -0.16 0.08 
La Paz 
Rural 424 -0.07 -.94 0.30 -0.17 
Urban 768 0.17 0.67 -0.17 0.08 
Oruro 
Rural 238 0.19 -.36 0.19 -0.11 
Urban 294 0.32 0.78 -0.16 0.07 
Pando 
Rural 92 0.00 -.56 0.21 -0.12 
Urban 44 0.24 0.68 -0.14 0.07 
Potosí 
Rural 343 0.11 -.54 0.22 -0.13 
Urban 277 0.31 0.80 -0.17 0.08 
Santa Cruz 
Rural 316 0.04 -0.63 0.22 -0.12 
Urban 604 0.21 0.72 -0.16 0.08 
Tarija 
Rural 199 0.08 -0.89 0.32 -0.17 
Urban 277 0.27 0.75 -0.16 0.08 
Total 
Rural 2 383 0.06 -0.78 0.30 -0.16 
Urban 3 257 0.24 0.73 -0.16 0.08 
Total 5 640 0.20 0.59 -0.14 0.06 









CHANGE INTHE PRIVATE UTILITY BY FACTOR OF PRODUCTION AND EDUCATION LEVEL  
(Percentage change) 
Factor of production Education Number of 
observations FTA CAN - EU 
FTA CAN-EU, 
no sensitives 
FTA CAN – EU, 
no Bolivia  
(Plur. State of) 
FTA CAN - EU , no 
Bolivia (Plur. State 
of), no sensitives 
Agriculture 
Illiterate 503 0.08 -0.97 0.34 -0.19 
Literate 1556 0.15 -0.77 0.32 -0.18 
Capital 
Illiterate 87 0.22 0.74 -0.17 0.08 
Literate 1189 0.20 0.70 -0.16 0.08 
Diversified 
Illiterate 32 0.24 0.69 -0.16 0.08 
Literate 580 0.21 0.69 -0.16 0.08 
Natural resources 
Illiterate 32 0.23 0.73 -0.17 0.08 
Literate 723 0.22 0.70 -0.16 0.08 
No information 
Illiterate 71 0.24 0.75 -0.17 0.08 
Literate 257 0.28 0.76 -0.16 0.07 
Non agriculture 
Illiterate 31 0.23 0.72 -0.16 0.07 
Literate 579 0.20 0.67 -0.16 0.08 
Total 
Illiterate 756 0.16 -0.12 0.08 -0.05 
Literate 4884 0.20 0.62 -0.14 0.07 
Source: Author estimations based on micro simulations. 
 
